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NEGOTIATED vs. COMPETITIVE DEBT FINANCING
RALPH S. PETERSON

*

INTRODUCTION

Competitive bidding is as old as the investment banking business itself.
Since the turn of the century this, has been the accepted method. of financing
by municipalities, political subdivisions,: and other public instrumentalities.
For example, since 1935 the firm of Halsey, Stuart & Co., Inc., alone or with
associates, has bid on over 6,500 such issues, ranging in size from less than
$100,000 to $300,000,000 each and aggregating a face amount of ove $9
billion.
Since 1926, pursuant to the policy then adopted by the Interstate Commerce Commission, several hundred railway equipment trust and terminal,
issues aggregating over $2 billion in face amount have been sold competitively.
The principle of competitive bidding for municipal, equpiment trust, and
terminal issu&s has been so thorbughly tested during var, boom and depression markets, that its advantages are no longer questioned. It was the extension of this principle, however, to public utility securities generally in 1941,
and to additional classes of railroad debt securities in 1944 which again aroused
organized opposition from the traditional utility and railroad bankers and gave
rise to their solemn predictions of the dire consequences which would follow
the adoption of competitive bidding for such securities.
It is not possible within the scope of this article to review all the arguments of opponents and proponents on this subject. These arguments 'have
been, fully and ably reviewed in the documents cited below.' These documents are the result of extensive investigations, hearings, testimony, briefs,
etc., and represent some of the most comp'etent evidence obtainable on the
subject. During the past seven years, over $8 billion of corporate securities
have been sold competitively, and over $3.6 billion have been sold.via negotiation. This represents the bulk of all corporate financing in the United States
during that time and the writer proposes to examine in some detail the results
obtained under the two methods of sale as they affect the borrower, the
underwriter and dealer, the regulatory agency and the public interest generally.
* Member of the firm of Halsey, Stuart & Co., Inc.

1. SEC (Public Utilities Division), THE PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING ARM'S LENGTH
BARGAINING AND COmPETITIVE CONDITIONS IN THE SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF SEcURITIES OF REGISTERED PUBLIc UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES AND

THEIR SUBSIDIAIES.

(Dec. 18, 1940)
SEC, Holding Company Act Release No. 2676, April 8, 1941.
ICC, Ex Parte 158, In the Matter of Competitive Bidding in the Sale of Securities
Under Section 20A of the Interstate Commerce Act (May 8, 1944).
California Railroad Commission Case No. 4761, Decision No. 38614, In the Matter
of the Investigation on the Commission's Motion to determine the propriety of requiring
public utilities to invite publicly, written sealed bids for the purchase of their sectirities.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITIVE BIDDING UNDER FEDERAL AND

STATE REGULATION

Competitive bidding under public regulation has developed in response
to public demand for elimination of those abuses which have hampered or
prevented arm's-length bargaining between banker and borrower in traditional
negotiated financing. Extensive testimony in this respect is available in the
verbatim record of investment banking hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee. 2 Further testimony in this respect is also contained in the transcript of hearings before regulatory bodies previously referred to.3
Instead of reviewing such testimony, the writer believes it more appropriate to restate some of the reasons which have impelled various regulatory
agencies to require competitive bids for security issues under their jurisdiction.
The fundamental reason for competitive bidding was well stated by the
late Commissioner Robert E. Healy, of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in his address of August 28, 1941, before the National Association
of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, shortly after the effective date of
that Commission's competitive bidding rule:
The insistence upon competition in the sale of this particular kind of merchandise
follows the traditional American pattern of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the
Federal Trade Commission Act. MA1of them aim to preserve competition and to keep
that competition fair. The laws, backed by both major political parties, are among the
foundation stones of our democratic system of capitalism. Let it not be thought that
Rule U-50 (competitive bidding) is merely a matter of business procedure. Ours is a
system of free enterprise and when practices are allowed to develop which eliminate
or suppress competition, the very fundamentals of that system are endangered. The
liberating influence of our competitive bidding rule will foster free enterprise and
competition in a field which has long been characterized by concentration of the management and underwriting of new securities in the hands of a few firms.

In adopting its requirement of competitive bidding on railroad debt securities, the Interstate Commerce Commission, in its Decision 4 of May 8, 1944,
stated:
In the exercise of our power to prescribe rates we are directed to give due consideration, among other factors, "to the need, in the public interest, of adequate and
efficient railway transportation service at the lowest cost consistent with the furnishing
of such service; and to the need of revenue sufficient to enable the carriers, under
honest, economical, and efficient management to provide such service." We have considered it our duty under the act to investigate and point out, as inconsistent with
efficient and economical management, glaring instances of what we consider improvident
2. VERBATIM

RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS

OF TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC

CommIrxE, Volume 10, December 12, 1939, to January 13, 1940.
3. Note 1 supra.
4. Note 1 supra.
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and wasteful expenditures, and we have always regarded the supervision of prices at
which securities are issued as one of our most important duties in approving the issue
of securities under Section 20a.

In-4939, the- Federal Communications Commission after completing its
extensive investigation of the telephone industry, recommended to the Congress that it be given authority to regulate the issuance of telephone securities, and on the subject of competitive bidding stated:
It would seem fair that, if the cost of bond money'is to be a factor in determining
ihterest during construction work -in progress and evidence in establishing a fair rate
of return, the investment bankers should be given an opportunity to make competitive
bids, and the investment market should be allowed to express itself freely as to the
5
rate of return at which it will supply the telephone business with that capital.

While this Commission still lacks authority over the issuance of securities,
it is.appropriate to note, that The American Telephone & Telegraph Company
and subsidiaries since 1941 have voluntarily, as a matter of sound corporate
financial policy, offered at competitive bidding over $1y2 billion of securities.
One of the pioneers in state legislation dealing with competitive bidding
was Massachusetts, where since 1870 its statutes have provided that, with certain exceptions, stocks of electric and gas companies not taken by shareholders
6
pursuant to preemptive rights should be sold by competitive bidding. In
1919, Massachusetts adopted a law (still in effect) requiring that gas and
electric utilities in "issuing bonds . . . should invite proposals for the pur-

chase thereof by advertisements in two or more newspapers." "
In 1935 the New Hampshire Public Service Commission adopted competitive bidding in Re Public Service Company of New Hampshire,8 saying:
Acting under this grant of authority, and because of our view that, under present
conditions, competitive bidding constitutes the best method of disclosing the most
favorable terms upon which bonds may be issued and sold by a public utility, our
authorization of a recent refunding operation by the petitioner herein required "comparable competitive bids secured in compliance with procedures acceptable to this Commission" as the basis for our supplement order relating to the terms and price- of the
proposed issue.
The results in that instance appear to justify our insistence upon the use of like
procedures in similar cases. Therefore our authorization herein will be subject to the
condition that the exact terms be determined after competitive bids have been secured ..

5. F.C.C. REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY IN THE U.S.

PURSUANT TO Pu. REs. No. 8, H. Doc. No. 340, 593 (1939).
6. MASS. GEN. LAWS C. 164, § 18, 19 (1932); Mass. Acts c. 179 (1870); Mass. Acts

c. 382 (1871) ; Mass. Acts c. 39, 305, 333 (1873) ; Mass. Acts c. 84 (1878) ; Mass. Acts
c. 90 (1879) ; Mass. Acts c. 315 (1893) ; Mass. Acts c. 472 (1894).
7. MAss. GEN. LAWS C. 164, § 15 (1932)8. 12 P.U.R. (N.S.) 408 (1935).
9. Id. at 410.
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More recently, California and New York; our two most important states (.in
value of utility assets'situated therein) Ihave adopted competitive biddihg.
Since 1944 the New York Public Service Commission has followed a
policy generally of placing the burden of proof on the applicant to show that
the proposed negotiated price is the best obtainable and where such showing
was .not conclusive, has required competitive bidding. The position of this.
Commission was demonstrated in its decision in Case No. 11929, denying the
petition of Kings County Lighting Company for a proposed negotiated sale
of $4,200,000 First Mortgage Bonds .and ordering competitive bidding. Commissioner Maltbie's opinion, approved by the Commission on May 22, 1945,
stated::
In recent years, and particularly in 1944 and 1945, the sale of securities through
competitive bidding has grown by leaps and bounds, and companies generally have
resorted to this method in preference to private sale or agreement without any public
offering. This Commission has rejected proposals for private sale because it did not
believe the companies had obtained as good terms as they could have secured; and in
every instance where the petition has been denied and competitive bidding has been
utilized, the company has obtained better terms, particularly in the way of lower interest rates and higher prices, than were proposed in the rejected petition. Whether a private agreement made without any" competitive bidding is the best that can be obtained
is obviously a matter of opinion until bids have been received; but there is one great
advantage of competitive bidding from the standpoint of the Commission and of company officials. We have had so much experience with competitive bidding ind the
benefits to the companies under our jurisdiction have been so great that there is no
longer any question of the practicability of competitive bidding and that this means
will obtain better terms than private sale. It may be that if conditions were to
change and through some means real competition were to be eliminated, so that it did
not represent a free expression of the financial world as to the proper price to be paid
for an issue, "competitive bidding" would need to be abandoned. But there is no such
condition at present and there seems to be no better way of determining what is the
best a company can obtain for the securities it issues than by inviting bids from any
source with full publicity and with ample time afforded to submit bids.

In 1945 the California Public Service Commission, on its own motion,
conducted an exhaustive investigation 10 into the subject of competitive bidding, and in its Decision No. 38,614 dated Jan. 14, 1946, adopting a competitive bidding rule, the Commission also concluded:
The record in this case shows that some utilities depend for advice and guidance
on the investment banker to whom they intend to sell their securities. Obviously, the
banker is an adversary party. It is doubtful whether the utilities should depend upon him
for advice. In several instances members of investment banking firms were on the
10. California Railroad Commission, Case No. 4761, Decision No. 38614, In the Matter of the Investigation on the Commission's Motion to determine the propriety of requiring public utilities to invite publicly, written sealed bids for the purchase of their securities,
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Board of:Directors of the utilities whose securities they purchased. The record lacks
convincing evidence that the utilities shopped around to sell their securities. A competitive bidding" rule may relieve the utilities from what seems an implied right that
bankers have to purchase the securities of certain utilities.
Much is said in this record about the price at which securities were sold. The price
of securities is not static. It changes from day to day and varies with the vicissitudes
of the business. No underwriter guarantees that the price at which he offers securities
will not decline. The testimony shows that rieither a negotiated sale nor a competitive
bidding sale carries with it an assurance that the price will not rise above or drop
below the offering price. That the price is affected by the terms of the securities, as well
as by the standing of the issuer, is self-evident. It is in the public interest that utilities
sell their securities at the highest price obtainable. We believe this can be achieved. more
readily when more than one investment banker is offered an opportunity to acquire their
securities.
THE RECORD OF NEGOTIATED AND COMPETITIVE DEBT FINANCING SINCE 1941

In order to obtain comparable statistical data, a study was made of all
competitive sales and negotiated public offerings of new, public utility, railroad (equipment trust issues excluded), and industrial debt issues sold during
the calendar years 1941 to 1948. The study does not include negotiated private placements, but does include all issues bid for competitively, whether
the high bidder was a consumer (bidding as principal for own account or
through an agent) or an underwrter bidding with a. view to public offering.
The facts relating to each issue were obtained from either the prospectus,
the offering circular, or related registration or bidding documents.
Because present federal and state competitive bidding rules have uniformly required bids on funded debt issues, and some rules frequently or
wholly exempt stocks and small 'ebt issues, this study has been limited to
debt issues of. $2,000,000 and over.
Also, in order to compare underwriting spread (difference between cost
to underwriters and the public offering price) only publicly offered issues have
been included. The study begins in January, 1941, in order to observe the full
operation of the competitive bidding rule promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission and effective on May 7, 1941.
Although industrial corporations are -unregulated in the issuance of
securities, the record of industrial debt financing has been included in order
to compare the results of such traditional negotiated financing with the financing of regulated railroads and public utilities where competitive bidding is
now the predominant practice.
In summary, the study covers 504 issues aggregating $11,976,680,000 face
amount, of which 217 issues aggregating $3,689,356,000 face amount were
sold via negotiation, and 287 issues aggregating .$8,287,324,000 face amount
were sold competitively.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
THE GROWTH OF COMIPETITIVE FINANCING SINCE 1941

From the study previously referred to, the following summary has been
prepared showing the face amount and percentage of competitive financing
in relation to total negotiated and competitive financing for each of the calendar
years from 1941 to 1948, and. the same figures for the entire seven-year
period.
Public
Total of
Utility
Railroad Industrial
3 Classes
(000)
(000)
(oo)
(000)
1941-Total Neg. and Comp. Sales.
506,495
81,115
317,200
904,810
Total Competitive Sales ......

% Competitive Sales .......

197,920

39.1

48,697

13,700

60.0

4.3

260,317

28.8

1942-Total Neg. and Comp. Sales..

240,350

9,500

202,200

452,050

Total Competitive Sales ......

209,350

9,500

218,850

60,183

None
115,994

None
362,050

352,500
67.4
1,758,868

% Competitive Sales .......

87.1

100.0

1943-Total Neg. and Comp. Sales..

346,800

Total Competitive Sales ......
% Competitive Sales .......
1944-Total Neg. and Comp. Sales..

320,800
92.5
966,293

31,700
52.7
430,525

665,843

426,025

Total Competitive Sales ......
% Competitive Sales .......

68.9

1945-Total Neg. and Comp. Sales.. 1,828,559

Total Competitive Sales ......
9o Competitive Sales .......

1,718,793

99.0

None
-

48.4
522,977

1,091,868
62.1

1,338,166

521,410

3,688,135

1,322,666

None

3,041,459

94.0

98.8

1946-Total Neg. and Comp. Sales.. 1,128,984
Total Competitive Sales ......
935,784
55 Competitive Sales .......
82.9

552,821
552,821
100.0

804,810
None
-

2,486,615
1,488,605
59.9

26,500

291,500

2,163,225

1947-Total Neg. and Comp. Sales.. 1,845,225

Total Competitive Sales ...... 1,792,225
9o Competitive Sales ........
97.1

26,500
100.0

-

82.5

15,000
5.1

1,833,725
84.8

1/1/41-Total Neg. and Comp. Sales.. 6,862,706
2,498,810
2,615.164
to
Total Competitive Sales ...... 5,840,715
2,417,909
28,700
1/1/48% Competitive Sales .......
85.1
96.8
1.1

11,976,680
8,287,324
69.2

From this summary it is clear that for the seven-year period, competitive
bidding has been the method under which 85.1% of all public utility and
96.8% of all railroad debt issues have been sold, even though Rule U-50 of
the Securities and Exchange Commission did not become effective until May
7, 1941, and the Interstate Commerce Commission order prescribing competitive bidding for railroad debt securities did not become effective until June
30, 1944. It is also significant that the only industrial debt securities sold competitively during this period were $13,700,000 McKesson & Robbins Debentures in July, 1941 (under Court jurisdiction), and $15,000,000 Cudahy
Packing Company First Mortgage Bonds voluntarily offered by the issuer at
competitive sale in May, 1947.
Out of almost $12 billion of total financing covered by this study, over
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$8! billion, or 69%o, was sold competitively-a substantial volume affording
some useful conclusions regarding this method of sale.
COMPETITIVE BIDDING HAS NOT BEEN RESTRICTED TO THE HIGHEST
GRADE STANDARDIZED ISSUES

One of the traditional arguments advanced against competitive bidding
was that this method would work only on high-grade standardized issues. The
following summary shows the face value distribution according to Standard
& Poor's rating assigned to $11,851,262,000 of negotiated and competitive
issues rated by this agency from 1941 to 1948.
Distribution of ParSold According to Standard & Poor's Rating
1-1-41 to 1-1-48

Public
Utility
Al--Negotiated (000) .............
% of Total ...................
Competitive (000) ............

Al

% of Total ...................
-Negotiated (000) .............
% of Total ...................
Competitive (000)

............

% of Total ...................
A

-Negotiated

(000)

.............

% of Total ....................
Competitive (000)

% of Total
Bl+ -Negotiated
% of Total
Competitive
% of Total
Sub- -Negotiated
Rated-1% of Total

.............

...................
(000) .............
...................
(000) ............
...................
(000) .............
...................

Competitive (000) ............
% of Total ..................
Total Par (000) Rated ................
Negotiated ..................
Competitive ...................

238,250
23.3
1,265,010

Railroad
-

338,816

21.9

301,000

14.3

22,418

29.5
2,130,859

325,085

13.7
30,483

24.0
97,059
9.5
949,417
16.4
26,200
- 2.5
46,661
.8
6,801,038
1,021,991
5,779,047

552,000
21.5

1,233,508

51.9
21,500
26.6
478,800
20.1
6,500
8.0

26.1
28,700

4.3
817,414
31.9
-

137,000
5.3
-

-

-

2,457,110
80,901
2,376,209

23.9
30.0

668,500

-

875,418
2,455,944

-

37.7

35.2
1,387,100

Total of
3 Classes

389,500
627,750
15.2
17.1
1,603,826
19.6

27.7

36.9
359,482

Industrial

2,593,114
2,564,414
28,700

1,058,465

28.9
2,649,308

32.4
935,973
25.5
1,428,217
17.5
169,700
4.6
46,661

.6
11,851,262
3,667,306
8,183,956

From the above figures it will be seen that out of the total financing for
the three classes shown, the proportion of highest grade Al-± issues sold under
the two methods was about equal-17.1 7 being negotiated, as against 19.6 %
competitive; in the second highest rating of Al, a greater percentage of such
issues were sold competitively (30.0%6), as against 23.9% negotiated; in
the third highest rating of A, competitive sales represented 32.4%, as against
28.9% negotiated, while in the lowest bank quality rating of Bl+, negotiated
and competitive sales 17.5%.
sales accounted. for 25.5

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
I In the sub-rated classification (i.e. ratings assigned to issues where the
investment elements do not predominate) the percentage of such issues s61d
via negotiation (4.6%) when compared to the percentage sold competitively
(.6%) does not indicate that negotiated financing is more adaptable to low
quality issues than competitive bidding, the difference in volume of sub-rated
issties sold amounting to less than $125 million.
Moreover, the 287 issues sold competitively represented a wide variety
of mortgage bonds with varying lien provisions; both serial and term debentures as well as notes; coupons ranged from 2Y2 % to 4Y %; the size of
the issues ranged from $2,000,000 to $200,000,000; the obligors represented
widely diversified activities and the securities offered appealed to a broad
variety of institutional and individual investors:
In the light of such facts it cannot be concluded that competitive bidding
has worked only in sales of the highest grade, standardized corporate credit.
AVERAGE SPREAD ON COMIPETITIvE FINANCING ABOUT HALF' or AVERAG62
SPREAD. ON NEGOTIATED FINANCING

In preparing the following summary, the gross profit or "spread" to the
underwriters has been computed as the difference between their cost (price
paid to the issuer) and the' initial public offering price. Such spread is shown
annually as a percentage of each year's face amount sold, and for the sevenyear period the total face amount gol'd, the total dollar spread and the average
.spread in per cent,
Railroad

Public Utility

Industrial

Avg. for 3 Classes

%Average Spread % Average Spread % Average Spread %Average Spread
Negotiated
1941 ... 1.788

1942 ...
1943

....

1944 _
1945 ...
1946 ...
1947 ....

3.023
2.012
1.189
1.367
.973
1.238

Competi-, Negotiated
tive
1.09
1.253
1.316
1.065
.682
.628
.574

1.527
-

1.748
1.511
1.729
-

*

Competitive

Negotiated

Competitive

Nego-

Competi-

tiated

tive

1.357
1.168
1.375
1.043
1.162
.843
1.136

1.719
1.957
2.307
1.924
1.975
1.175
1.264

1.569

1.742
2.099
2.169
1.590
1.866
-1.136
1.26

1.154,
1.249
1.321
1.057
.888
.707
.585

-

-

.98

Total
1/1/41 to
1/1/48
Face Amt.
Sold (000) ... 1,021,991 5,751,365 80,901 2,272,645 2,586,464 28,700 3,689,356 8,052,710
Total
68,032
57,985
362
42,071
24,324
43,346 1,329
14,585
Spread (000)
Weighted
.... 1.428
Av.-%
.84
1.572
1.070 . 1.627 1.261
.754 1.643
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From the above table it is apparent that for the seven-year period the
average spread of 1.428% 'on negotiated, public utility financing was about
twice-the average spread of .754% on coipetitive utility financing, and-that
on railroad financing the average-negotiated spread of 1.643 % was about 1/3
higher than the average competitive spread of 1.07%.
For the three classes of issues combined, the spread averaged 1.572%
on $3,689,356,000 face amount of negotiated sales as-against average spread
of .845% on $8,052,710,000 sold competitively, a, difference of .727o lower
spread on competitive sales, or a dollar difference on $3,689,356,000 negotiated
financing of over $26,821,000. In other words, absence'of competitibn on
guch negotiated volume either cost the issuers over $26,000,000 because of less
proceeds, or the investors paid over $26,000,000 too much underwriting profit.
Any comparison of competitive with negotiated average underwriting
spreads amply confirms the fact that competitive bidding produces competition in bankers' gross profits with substantial distribution economies to issuer
and investor.
C0MPETITIVE BIDDING HAS REDUCED OR ELIMIINATED THE MANAGEMENT FEi..
CHARGED UNDERWRITERS BY THEIR REPRESENTATIVE

A customary practice of the Underwriters' Representative or Manager
has been to charge participating underwriters a management fee as compensation for services in forming and managing the underwriting group.
The amount of such fee is usually calculated as a percentage of either the face
amount of the issue managed or the gross profit payable to participants. The

following table compares the amount of such fee on negotiated and cbhipetitive financing in relation to the face amount managed.
Negotiated Competitive

Total

3,689,356
1,021,991
80,901
2,586,464

8,287,324
5,840,715
2,417,909
28,700

11,976,680
6,862,706
2,498,810
2,615,164

2) Total Par (000) on which Mgt. Fee Charged ... 2,502,370
"7.76,916
Public Utility ...............................
Railroad ...................................
...................... 1,725,454
Industrial ......
6,)84
3) Amt. of Mgt. Fee Charged (000) .............
. 1,291
Public Utility .............................
Railroad ...................................
4,793
Industrial ....................... ............
.243
4) 70 Mgt. Fee of Par on which Charged ..........

3,993,245
2,880,082
1,113,163

6,495,615
3,656,998
1,113,163
1,725,454
8,045
2,624
. 628
4,793
.124

166

.0463
.0564

1) TotalfPar Sold by Issuer (000) .............
Public Utility .........................
Railroad ....................................
Industrial ..................................

Public Utility ..... :....
Railroad ...................-......

Industrial ...................

........

.........
: ........ .

. .........

.277

-

1,961
1,333
628
.0491
-

.

.0717
.05(A

.27;
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. From these computations it will be noted that on total sales of $11,976,680,000, a record of the amount of management fee was available with respect
to issues aggregating $6,495,615,000 face amount, leaving about $5Y billions
of sales on which the amount of -the management fee (if any) was not
disclosed in the prospectus, offering circular, or related documents.
Total management fees of $6,084,000 were charged on $2,502,370,000
face value of negotiated financing, or .243 % of such face amount, whereas
on $3,993,245,000 of competitive financing the total management fees charged
were $1,961,000, or .049% of such amount. In other words, the per cent of
management fees charged on negotiated financing was about five times greater
than on competitive financing-further evidence that competitive bidding
forces competition not only in price but also in underwriting terms.
RANGE OF BIDS DEMONSTRATES INDEPENDENT AND VARIED PRICING
JUDGMENT

The range of bids (difference between highest and lowest bid) offers
conclusive evidence that the pricing of securities is not an exact science but
is subject to a yarying range of investment opinion. The following summary covers 245 issues, or $7,082,826,000 of securities on which the range
of bids could be computed, out of the total of 287 issues, or $8,287,324,000
sold competitively. The difference of $1,204,498,000 is represented by 22 issues aggregating $610,138,000 on which only one bid was received, and by
14 issues aggregating $498,900,000 where the high bid was a "basket bid,"
i.e., a single bid for two or more issues sold simultaneously as a single "package" or unit, and where the proportionate amount of each bid could not be allocated to a single issue. The remainder, or $95,460,000, is represented by six
issues where the range could not be computed because the lowest bid received
was not a matter of public record.
Public
Utility

% Range

Total of 3 Classes

Railroad

Total
Par (000) Rec.
Industrial 2 Bids & Over Range (000)

%
Range

1.587

.628

-

1944 ............

721

1.013

-

849,868

7,043

1.892
1.688
1.506
.829

1945 ...........

.694

.963

-

2,570,159

20,351

.792

70

.448

-

1,322,067

8,097

.612

538

1.045

-

1,739,725

9,492

.546

Par Sold
(000) .... 5,260,677

1,808,449

13,700

7,082,826

$ Range (000)

38,440

16,452

204

% Range....

.731

.910

1.489

1941 ........... 1.409
1942 ........... 1.861
1943

...........

1946 ............
1947 ............

4.718
.768

1.489

247,357
59,850

4,679
1,010

293,800

4,424

Total 1/1/41
to 1/1/48
55,096

.778
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From the above table it will be seen that on over $5Y billion of utility
issues the high and low bidders were over $38 million apart in their respective
valuations of such issues, or a difference of .731% of the face amount bid for;
the range on railroad issues averaged .910% of the face amount bid for,
and on the one industrial which received three bids the range was 1.489%, so
that on total financing of $7,082,826,000 the difference in price views amounted
to over $55 million, or an average of .778% of the face amount.
Such difference in price views makes it imperative that the issuer obtain
the broad judgment of the entire market through competitive bids, instead
of the more limited views of the traditional banker in a negotiated transaction.
One of the arguments against competitive bidding has been that it leads
to over-pricing in a strong or rising market and to under-pricing in a weak or
declining one. The weakness of either view is the fact that it is, of necessity,
based on hindsight, and, it would be a genuine contribution to the pricing art
'if any underwriter could state, before the offering date, the exact price at
which a particular security could be successfully sold. The fallacy of the argument can be shown, however, not only by a consideration of pricing technique,
but external market factors affecting the price.
The determination of the bid price is a carefully executed procedure designed to explore every element of price opinion represented among the several bidders. Such opinions are obtained by means of price meetings at which
the several bidders may appear or file their price views or price limits.
The purpose of these price meetings is to canvass and evaluate the views
expressed by all participants and to compare the credit of the issuer with other
securities of similar kind and quality. This is done by means of statistical
comparisons and other relevant information. All price views are carefully
tabulated and, when finally determined, the price which is bid represents the
considered judgment of the several bidders and no bidder needs accept a
commitment at a price which he believes does not represent a salable value
in comparison with other securities of similar type and quality.
Despite the care which is taken to arrive at proper prices and terms, no
bidder can say whether an issue is properly priced until its market reception.
Even then, no one can guarantee that the offering price will not rise or fall in
competition with other securities in a free market, nor can anyone forecast
the extent or duration of subsequent market changes. If such determination
were possible, there would be no reason for seeking competitive bids, nor
would there be an range of bid and asked prices in the billions of dollars of
securities now traded in the secondary market.
For these reasons, no underwriter, whether in a negotiated or competitive
sale is going to name any price which he does not believe represents a salable
value under existing market conditions, inasmuch as all underwriters buy with
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a view to resale at a profit and not for permanent investment. Furthermore,
any tendency to over-bid inflicts its own penalty-any underwriter which has
paid mor'e than the market will bear cannot repeat the same mistake too often
and still stay in business.
. When the traditional banker in a private negotiation prices a security
under, the market so as to minimize or eliminate the risk of an unsuccessful
sale, and the issue then goes to an immediate and substantial premium, absent
a concurrent rise in the price of comparable securities, a conclusive presumption exists that the issuer did not get full value received and that the underwriter was compensated for a risk he did not assume.
It has also been argued that in a declining or weak market the highest bid
..
will be lowir than the price that would be paid under private negotiation.
While this statement is simply unsupported argument it is more logical to
say that the traditional banker, under private negotiation, is far more likely
to offer a price to the issuer on a basis intended to assure complete safety for
himself, than is the bidder who must compete in order to stay in business.
Moreover,: since competitive bidding subjects each issue to a broader range
of market appraisal than is possible in a privately negotiated transaction, the
argument in this respect is simply contrary to experience, and" this fact has
been amply demonstrated- by the results obtained under competitive bidding
for railroad equipment trust issues during the last 20 years and municipal
issues for the past 50 years. Also, this argument becomes meaningless when
put to a real test, because under any depression or panic conditions the issuer
is reluctant to borrow and the investor to lend. As a consequence, there is no
appreciable financing during such periods to test the alleged fortitude of the
traditional banker.
In short, competitive bidding results in the best price and terms for the
issuer-which is a fact. It subjects the underwriter to some risk-for which
he is paid. It requires the investor to pay the market price for his securitieswhich is what he pays for everything else.
COMPLEXITIES OF FINANCING ARE

No

BARRIER TO COMPETITION

Another objection urged against competitive bidding was that such
method of sale was not adaptable to complex debt structures, especially railroad mortgages. Opponents have urged in particular that the numerous and
technical mortgage provisions relating to the debt structures of American
steam railroads required special analytical and customer -educational ability
and that such issues could not be sold as readily by competitive bidding as
by the traditional negotiated route. The fact is that in the last seven years
80 steam railroad issues aggregating over $2.4 billion have been sold competitively. This.volume represents 96.8% of all railroad debt financing during
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that period and the list of issues sold constitutes a veritable who's Who of
American railroad financing.
COMPETITIvE BIDDING

HAS NOT

ENCOURAGED IRRESPONSIBLE BIDDING

While the argument in this respect does not define irresponsible bidders
or bidding, the record during the past seven years fails to disclose rejection
of any bids on such grounds.
Today, the business .conduct of securities dealers is closely supervised
by stock exchanges and local and national dealer organizations. Furthermore,
all dealers and underwriters are subject to broad civil and criminal liabilities
for violations, particularly of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities' Ekchange Act of 1934, and rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange
Commission generally. Any violations of the rules or laws administered by
these agencies subjects the offending dealer-either to censure, fine, expulgion,
revocation of his license, or other penalties designed to rid the industry of
any undesirable members- Financial statements of dealers are also readily
available to any interested party, and bidders must also qualify themselves in
advance of the bidding by means of bidders' questionnaires submitted to the
-.
issuer, trustee, bnd underwriter's representative.
In view of the extensive regulation to which dealers are now subjiect, it
cannot be concluded that competitive bidding has developed irresponsibility
in the investment banking industry.
COMPETITIVE BIDDING HAS WORKED ON BOTH SMALL AND LARGE ISSUES

Another stock argument against competitive bidding has been'that, this
method -would not work on small issues because bidders would not spend
time studying a small issue without assurance that they would have securities
to sell and that large issues would not obtain more than one bid because there
was not enough strength in'>he investment banking business to -form more
than one large underwriting group. The following summary shows what. has
happened.
-

Distribution of Par Value Sold and Number of Bids Per Issue
According to Size of Issue

1-1-41 to 1-1-48
Public

Utility

Total of

Railroad Industrial .3 Classes

From $2,000,000 up to $25,000,000 each
Negotiated par sold as % of grand total

32.9

64.8

40.5

39.0

Competitive par sold as % of grand total
Average number of bids per issue ......
From $25,000,000 up to $50,000,000 each

21.5
5.0

14.9
3.6

100.0
2.0

19.8
4.6
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Negotiated par sold as % of grand total
Competitive par sold as 47 of grand total
Average number of bids per issue ......
From $50,000,000 up to $100,000,000 each

20.3
31.6
2.8

35.2
41.4
2.6

24.7
None

Negotiated par sold as % of grand total
Competitive par sold as % of grand total
Average number of bids per issue ......
$100,000,000 and over

20.3
23.0
2.1

None
43.7
2.2

18.4
None

Negotiated par sold as 9o of grand total
Competitive par sold as % of grand total
Average number of bids per issue ......
Grand Total

26.5
23.9
2.0

None
None

16.4
None

Negotiated par sold (000) ............ 1,021,991
49
Number negotiated issues sold ......
Avg. size of negotiated issues (000) 20,857
Competitive par sold (000) ........... 5,840,715
205
Number competitive issues sold ......
Avg. size of competitive issues (000) 28,491
4.0
Average number bids per issue ......
7.0
% of par receiving 1 bid per issue ......
49.9
% of par receiving 2 bids per issue .....
21.4
% of par receiving 3 bids per issue .....
.9.5
% of par receiving 4 bids per issue .....
6.7
% of par receiving 5 bids per issue .....
5.5
% of par receiving over 5 bids .........

-

-

-

-

80,901 2,586,464
159
9
16,267
8,989
28,700
2,417,909
2
80
14,350
30,224
2.0
2.9
52.3
7.6
76.0
47.7
19.3
12.7
1.1
1.1

23.7
34.3
2.7
18.5
29.0
2.1
18.8
16.9
2.0
3,689,356
217
17,002
8,287,324
287
28,876
3.7
7.4
52,1
20.9
10.4
5.0
4.2

In the smallest size group (issues of $2,000,000 to but not including
$25,000,000) it will be seen that the par value of such issues accounted for
39.0% of the total negotiated sales of $3,689,356,000 and that competitive
sales accounted for only 19.8% out of total competitive volume of $8,287,324,000. The heavier concentration of negotiated financing in this size group
is -due to the inclusion of 127 of the 159 industrial issues sold during this
period. These 127 industrial issues averaged $84 million each. The average
number of bids (4.6) for issues in this group shows, however, that the smaller
the issue the greater the average number of bids per issue. For"example, one
issue ($4,500,000 Madison Gas & Electric Company Bonds) sold in 1946 received 16 bids and one issue ($4,500,000 Metropolitan Edison Company
Bonds) sold in 1947 received 11 bids.
While the opposition argument does not define either a small or large issue, the summary shows that the larger issues offer no obstacles to competitive
bidding. The 25 to $50 million group accounted for 34.3% of the volume bid
for and received an average of 2.7 bids per issue, the next largest group accounted for 29% of the vrolume bid for and averaged 2.1 bids per issue, whereas issues of $100,000,000 and over accounted for 16.9% of the total volume
bid for and received an average of 2 bids per issue. In the latter class, 10
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issues were bid for, all utilities, of which two issues were for $200,000,000
each, one for $175,000,000, and one for $160,000,000, and the remainder for
lesser amounts. In this connection it will be noted that negotiated issues
averaged $17,002,000, whereas competitive issues averaged $28,876,000 each,
indicating that competitive sales are generally larger than negotiated sales.
Public utility financing during the period attracted an over-all average of
four bids per issue, and railroad financing 2.9 bids per issue. The average of
two bids on the industrial competitive financing is inconclusive because only
two issues were sold competitively during this period.
The last six lines of the summary show the distribution of bids by face
amount bid for. This shows that 7.4% of the $8,287,324,000 bid for received
one bid, or conversely that over 92% of such volume received two bids or
more, the average for total financing being 3.7 bids per issue.
COMPETITIVE BIDDING HAS

NOT

RESTRICTED UNDERWRITER'S

INVESTIGATION OR ELIMINATED THE SMALL DEALERS

The opposition argument here is to the effect that bidders can not afford
to make as exhaustive an investigation of a proposed issue as could an underwriter in a negotiated transaction where he was certain of obtaining the issue,
and that competitive bidding would eliminate the small dealer.
As to alleged lack of investigation, such argument forgets the fact that
statement and related documents now filed with the SEC and
registration
the
other public agencies on utility and industrial companies, contain a most comprehensive disclosure of facts and financial statements relating to their affairs. The same is true of railroads, whose affairs are most thoroughly publicized in annual reports, offering circulars, Interstate Commerce Commission
reports, mortgage maps, traffic density services, and other sources of information. As a result, an issuer's affairs are no longer a mystery to anyone, least
of all a bidder and the prospectus or offering circular used by an underwriter
or dealer today is a marked contrast to the customary one-page president's
letter supplied years ago (and usually written by the traditional banker) in the
sale of a negotiated issue. The truth of the matter is, that since 1933 the lia,bility'provisions of the Securities Act attaching to misrepresentation or omission of any material fact, have placed definite investigatory responsiblities on
both underwriters and dealers and such responsibilities are not affected by
the method under which an issuer decides to market its securities.
As to elimination of small dealers, the seven-year record shows that competitive bidding has broadened the activities of such dealers, that bidding,
underwriting and selected dealer groups have increased in size despite the
essentially institutional character of the market for new issues during this
period. For example, in the last seven years, 1,054 bids were submitted by
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31,809 bidders on 287 issues aggregating $8,287,324,000 face amount. Out
of this number, 12,676 of those bidders became underwriters of 274 issues
aggregating $8,091,202,000 face amount by virtue of being members of the
274 bidding groups submitting the bid accepted by the issuer. The number
and par value of the issues underwritten excludes 13 issues aggregating
$186,122,000 also bid for but not underwritten, and where the issue was
awarded either to an institutional investor or his agent. This leaves 19,133
unsuccessful bidders (31,809 less 12,676) who also bid for the same par
value but whose 747 bids (1,054 less 287) were rejected by the issuer. These
unsuccessful bidders acting as prospective underwriters, made the same initial
study of the proposed issue and the issuer's credit as did the successful bidder. Such pre-bidding study has produced broader dealer interest and customer education and discussion of a new issue and the practice has also developed
under competitive bidding whereby successful bidders in forming selling
groups have included unsuccessful bidders as participants in dealer marketing
of an issue.
Under competitive bidding any underwriter or dealer is free to join
any one of the several bidding groups which may be formed, and indeed there
is competition among underwriter's representatives in the formation of strong
bidding groups. As a result, decisions affecting membership and size of participation are decided on the basis of underwriting capacity and distributing
ability instead of reciprocity and other mutually cozy relationships which frequently dictate such decisions in a negotiated issue.
SOME SPECIFIC SAVINGS FRoM COMPETITIvE, BIDING

Since 1941 there have been six issues 1 where the regulatory agency
denied a firm negotiated offer and then ordered competitive bidding.
These six issues aggregating $138,700,000 face amount, when sold competitively, produced total savings over the rejected negotiated offers of $6,504,512 on the basis book method of computation and $5,145,864 on the net
interest cost method of computation. Expenses on the issues under the negotiated offers would have been $750,546 or 54/100% of their face amount,
whereas expenses of public offering were $972,884 or 70/100 %-an increase
of 16/100o of the face amount of $222,338 to place the issues in salable
form for competitive bidding and public offering.
In addition to these dollar savings, there were also intangible advantages
11. Public Service Electric & Gas Corporation (N.J.) $15,000,000 30 Yr. 3% Bonds

sold 6-1-42; Kings County Lighting Co. (N.Y.) $4,200,000 30 Yr. 3y8% Bonds sold

8-6-42; Brooklyn Union Gas Co. (N.Y.) $30,000,000 25 Yr. 3y% Bonds arid $12,000,000
25 Yr. 4% Debentures sold 9-20-44; Georgia Power & Light Co. (Ga.) $2,500,000 30
Yr. 3% Bonds sold 5-7-45; Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Calif.) $75,000,000 40
Yr. 2y4% Debentures sold 12-10-45.
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to the -issuers on five of these issues which were publicly offered instead of
privatelyplaced as contemplated by the negotiated offer. A public offering
creates public interest in the issuer and the issue, not only on the part of
investors but also dealers and statistical organizations. As a result, the securities are,quoted and traded in the secondary market and they become rated by
statisti~il anid otlier advisory services, all of which is helpful in establishing
the public credit f -the issuer and facilitates subsequent financing or refunding.
COMPETITIVE BIDDING AIDS PUBLIC REGULATION

An accepted principle of public regulation is that the regulatory body employ the best information available for the. discharge of its public obligations.
This principle is recurrent in statements on competitive bidding.
The Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, in explaining its requirement of competitive bidding, rested it upon the need "to
be informed adequately as to the propriety of any authorization" and that
"evidence must be before it on which to base its action." The former Chairman of the District Commission explained that in the absence of competitive
bidding, a regulatory body cannot be assured of the correctness of its determination of price. This he belie, ed was due to the fact that the regulatory
body could not pretend to be as expert as the banker on market factors, and
that it was jockeyed into quick decisions for fear of delaying a proposed issue
12
in the face of market fluctuations, and for other reasons.
Similarly, the New Hampshire Public Service Commission stated that
"competitive bidding constitutes the best method of disclosing the most favorable terms upon which bonds may be issued and sold." 13
The Securities and Exchange Commission, charged with a similar responsibility. with respect to the regulation of securities, concluded that it was
not in a position to review the fairness of price of proposed utility securities
while investment bankers continued to dominate these transactions. As Commissioner Robert E. Healy put it, the Securities and Exchange Commission
concluded that "there was no way short of competitive bidding that would afford us satisfactory means of determining the reasonableness of spreads or
the fairness of prices, assure disinterested advice in financial matters to the
companies concerned and effectively control their dealings and affiliates." 14
The Interstate Commerce Commission in its report dated May 8, 1944,
adopting competitive bidding stated:
12. Elgen, Value of Competitive Bidding for Utility Securities, P.U. FORT. 729 (June
10, 1937).
13. Re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 12 P.U.R. (N.S.) 408 (1935).
14. Address before the National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners,
August 28, 1941.

..
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The requirement that railroads resort to competitive bidding in selling equipment
trust certificates and certain terminal company bonds has aided us in determining the
fairness and adequacy of the price being paid for the securities and the reasonableness of
the spreads. A similar requirement in case of other security issues by railroad companies would aid us in discharging our duties under See. 20a.

Also the California Public Service Commission in its Decision No. 38614
dated January 15, 1946, promulgating a competitive bidding rule, stated:
While the Commission has positive authority to fix the price at which a utility
may sell its securities, it should do so only upon having before it competent evidence.
The bids are a form of evidence helpful in determining the price at which the securities
should be sold.

Further, on this point, the New York Public Service Commission in the
Kings County Lighting decision stated:
Whether a private agreement made without any competitive bidding is the best
that can be obtained is obviously a matter of opinion until bids have been received.

In the absence of competitive bids, the regulatory agency when considering price and terms of sale, obtains only the views of the traditional banker.
Such views may be biased in cases where such banker had any difficulty in
marketing previous securities of the issuer, or such views may be limited
either by reason of a limited underwriting capacity, commitments in other
securities, a limited clientele for the particular issue under consideration, or
the ever-present non-competitive profit motive.
Under competitive bidding the regulatory agency obtains the benefit of
a broader cross section of investment opinion, not only as to price, but also
competition among bankers with respect to terms.
SOME PRACTICAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF COMPETITIVE BIDDING

Despite the basic advantages inherent in the principle of competitive
bidding, no one has contended that this method is practical for every type of
financial transaction and security. A study of the rules promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
and the California Public Service Commission, discloses a general recognition
of the following basic exemptions under which certain transactions and issues
are excluded from the requirements of each rule.
1) Any security exchanged for outstanding securities where no fee is
paid for soliciting such exchange.
This exemption appears in each of the three rules-and permits an
issuer to effect exchanges with existing security holders without any
payment for soliciting the exchange.
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2) Issuance of securities pro rata to existing security holders pursuant to
preemptive right.
This exemption is also recognized by each of the rules and unless the unexchanged portion is to be underwritten, a straight preemptive offer is exempted.
3) Any security issued during reorganization or financial readjustment
pursuant to court jurisdiction.
This exemption also appears in each of the rules cited and merely
recognizes the authority of a court to impose such terms as may be
appropriate in connection with the issuance of a new security.
4) Short term notes or conditional sales contracts.
While such financing is exempted in each of the rules referred
to, the maturity of such financing varies from a minimum of three
years in the I.C.C. rule, to a maximum of ten years in the S.E.C. rule.
Since the intent is obviously to exempt short term bank financing,
it would appear that any maturity over three years raises a question
as to whether such a maturity is in fact an appropriate short term
commercial bank investment to be exempted from a rule. 5) Common and Preferred stocks. Only the Interstate Commerce Commission exempts railroad equity issues from their competitive bidding
requirement. In this connection; the concurring opinion of Chairman
Patterson is pertinent.
I concur in the majority report but would also require competitive bidding in
the sale of common and preferred stock not sold or otherwise issued to existing holders
of securities of the issuing company. I see no good reason for this exception by the
majority and the report shows none.

6) Small issues where the aggregate proceeds to be received would be
insufficient to justify the expense of registration under the Federal
Securities Act in 'contemplation of a public offering via competitive
bidding.
Here it will be noted that each of the three rules fixes the proceeds to be exempted at $1,000,000, and whether such amount would
be appropriate in all cases would depend on the average size and capital requirements of the smaller issuers.
7) It is also noted that each of the three rules referred to contains a
general exemption covering any issue as to which the Commission
shall find, upon due showing by the applicant, that competitive bidding
should not be required.
This is an important and necessary exemption to take care of
any special situations which may arise and where the burden of proof
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rests on the applicant to convince the Commission that competition
in the sale of the proposed security is not practical or feasible.
The Annual Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission
covering its fiscal year ended June 30, 1947; contains the following
appropriate statement on the subject of exemptions from its competitive bidding rule U-50:
The past year has seen the first extended period in which the Commission's
competitive bidding rule has been called upon to function in a falling market. It has
been recognized from the outset, of course, that the competitive bidding procedure is not
necessarily adapted to all securities and all market conditions, and exemption provisions were thus made an integral part of rule U-S0. However, it has been necessary
to grant exemptions in only a few cases even under the relatively unfavorable market
conditions of the year just past.
Although the volume of offerings under rule U-50 dropped sharply from the
previous year, the total of $466,265,349 for the 12 months ended June 30, 1947, was
exceeded only in the 1945 and 1946 fiscal years, when refunding operations were at
their height. From the standpoint of equity securities alone, the 1947 volume was surpassed only by that of 1946.

One of the important effects following the adoption of each rule was
to shift the burden of proof from each Commission to show affirmative cause
for competition, to each applicant to show cause for exemption. That the
burden of proof should rest on the applicant and exemption be decided on the
merits of each application was recognized in the report of the Interstate Commerce Commission where, in adopting its rule, it stated:
On the-question of why we. should adopt a rure or regulations requiring competitive bidding when we have the power to require it in any specific case if it should
appear that such a method is appropriate, proponents point out that in recent proceedings while expressing the opinion that the market has not been adequately tested
in the paiticular cases before us, we nevertheless felt constrained to approve arrangements to which the railroad had committed itself in reliance upon the fact that no
existing rule required it to solicit bids. They say that the absence of such a rule has
thus come to be a persuasively practical argument for not requiring competitive
bidding in particular cases. From this they argue that as the situation stands today,
either private negotiation as a practically uniform thing will prevail without shopping
around and without competition of any kind, or we must annoutce a change, if we want
that change to take place.
There are also certain procedural provisions which have developed under
these rules to assure that all bidders receive fair play and equal opportunity.

Some of the more important provisions are:
S1) Adequate publicity in calling for bids. This is achieved by newspaper
publication of an invitation for bids, stating where copies of the
bidding documents may be obtained.
2) Opening and publicizing bids. Another provision is that all bids be
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publicly opened at a specified date, hour and place, at which time
representatives of the various bidders can be present to examine each
bid submitted.
3) If two or more issues are to be bid for at the. same sale, and "basket"
bids for all issues as a unit are permitted, the basket bidders should
also submit separate bids so that the issuer can obtain the best terms
by either selecting the best basket bid or that combination of separate
bids which will produce the lowest cost to the issuer.
4) How winning bid is to be determined. Whether the lowest interest
cost is determined via the basis book or net interest cost method, is immaterial, so long as all bidders know in advance which method will be
used.
5) Statement of action taken on each bid. The rules referred to contain
a provision under which the applicant files a statement of compliance
with the rule, showing all bids received and which bid or bids were
accepted or rejected. In this connection it should be noted that neither
one of the three rules cited requires the issuer to accept any bid,"or
even to accept the highest bid. Consequently, if an issuer so chooses;
it can reject any or all bids which either do not comply with its specifications governing submission of bids or for any other reason which
the issuer decides its valid justification for rejoction. The only
requirement is that the issuer file a statement of the action it has
taken.
SOME COTMIMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The record of competitive bidding for corporate securities amply demonstrates a proved and tested method of sale, whereby either a public or private
issuer can most effectively canvass the broadest range of market opinion and
obtain binding bids, in accordance with its own specifications, for the marketing of its securities on terms most advantageous to it.
Competitive bidding has effectively eliminated the charges, countercharges and resultant Commission investigations of concentration of underwriting control, bankers' preferential rights, agreements to share or divide
business, frozen accounts, proprietary interests, pro rata participations, rotation
and swapping of leadership, reciprocity and: related pactices which created and
perpetuated the traditional negotiated financing relatiofilship. As a result,
it has re-established the independence of issuers, umderxvriters and distributing dealers and created a broader and more wholesome interest in financingby a wider variety of banking houses, with resultant marketing'economies.
Such record also supplies complete and conclusive evidence that the traditional banker arguments against competition are basically self-serving and
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without merit in fact or logic. Their predictions of the drastic consequences
which would follow adoption of competitive bidding have simply failed to
materialize. Thig is also attested by the fact that no changes have been made
and none are contemplated by the regulatory agencies in their administration
of the rules under which most securities of regulated issuers are now sold
competitively.
Experience has also shown that sponsorship of an issue by the traditional banker has not endowed such issue with any bench-mark of quality not inherent in the security itself or the credit of the obligor. Issues sold under
either method are subject to the same market and economic influences which
affect all securities generally and the results in this respect are no different ol
either negotiated or competitive sales. Neither does the record support the
allegation that an issuer needs the exclusive advice of the traditional banker
in formulating -a financial program. Such argument overlooks the fact, that
to an ever-increasing extent, federal and state regulatory agencies are passing
judgment on financing proposals and insisting upon stronger capitalization and
earning structures, adequate protective provisions in mortgages and charters,
conservative accounting procedures and sounder corporate practices. In fact,
considerable regulatory activity in recent years has been concentrated on overhauling the financial.stuctures and policies of many corporations whose securities had been designed and distributed by their traditional banker in negotiated transactions.'
Even the most case-hardened critics of competitive bidding have grudgingly "admitted that it produces better prices and lower spreads-sometimes.
When the record shows a range of bids amounting to over $55 million on 245
issues coupled with the fact that the traditional banker was the successful
bidder on less than one third of those issues, then even the "sometimes" qualification wilts. When the record also shows that over $8 billion of securities
were marketed competitively at an average spread of about one half the average spread on some $3.7 billion of negotiated sales, the difference of $26,000,000 is tangible proof that the issuer and/or the investor got a better bargainnot the traditional banker.
The results under competitive bidding for municipal, public utility and
railroad securities have contradicted every argument of opponents. This
leaves industrial securities as the last stand of the traditional bankers in their
attempts to resist extension of competitive bidding to such securities. There is
no question that competitive bidding will benefit industrial issuers, stockholders and investors. The only question is-how long can industrial management afford to ignore those benefits?

